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ABSTRACT
Polymorphism and inheritance make C++ suitable for writing com-
plex software, but significantly increase the attack surface because
the implementation relies on virtual function tables (vtables). These
vtables contain function pointers that attackers can potentially hi-
jack and in practice, vtable hijacking is one of the most important
attack vector for C++ binaries.
In this paper, we present VTable Pointer Separation (vps), a prac-
tical binary-level defense against vtable hijacking in C++ appli-
cations. Unlike previous binary-level defenses, which rely on un-
sound static analyses tomatch classes to virtual callsites, vps achieves
a more accurate protection by restricting virtual callsites to validly
created objects. More specifically, vps ensures that virtual callsites
can only use objects created at valid object construction sites, and
only if those objects can reach the callsite. Moreover, vps explic-
itly prevents false positives (falsely identified virtual callsites) from
breaking the binary, an issue existing work does not handle cor-
rectly or at all. We evaluate the prototype implementation of vps
on a diverse set of complex, real-world applications (MongoDB,
MySQL server, Node.js, SPEC CPU2017/CPU2006), showing that
our approach protects on average 97.8% of all virtual callsites in
SPEC CPU2006 and 97.4% in SPEC CPU2017 (all C++ benchmarks),
with amoderate performance overhead of 11% and 9% geomean, re-
spectively. Furthermore, our evaluation reveals 86 false negatives
in VTV, a popular source-based defense which is part of GCC.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software implemented in the C++ language is vulnerable to in-
creasingly sophisticated memory corruption attacks [16, 17, 26, 39,
42]. C++ is often the language of choice for complex software be-
cause it allows developers to structure software by encapsulating
data and functionality in classes, simplifying the development pro-
cess. Unfortunately, the binary-level implementations of C++ fea-
tures such as polymorphism and inheritance are vulnerable to control-
flow hijacking attacks, most notably vtable hijacking. This attack
technique abuses common binary-level implementations of C++
virtual methods where every object with virtual methods contains
a pointer to a virtual function table (vtable) that stores the addresses
of all the class’s virtual functions. To call a virtual function, the
compiler inserts an indirect call through the corresponding vtable
entry (a virtual callsite). Using temporal or spatial memory corrup-
tion vulnerabilities such as arbitrary write primitives or use-after-
free bugs, attackers can overwrite the vtable pointer so that subse-
quent virtual calls use addresses in an attacker-controlled alterna-
tive vtable, thereby hijacking the control flow. In practice, vtable
hijacking is a common exploitation technique widely used in ex-
ploits that target complex applications written in C++ such as web
browser and server applications [40].
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions [9, 13, 32, 35, 41] protect
indirect calls by verifying that control flow is consistent with a
Control-Flow Graph (CFG) derived through static analysis. How-
ever, most generic CFI solutions do not take C++ semantics into ac-
count and leave the attacker with enough wiggle room to build an
exploit [26, 39]. Consequently, approaches that specifically protect
virtual callsites in C++ programs have become popular. If source
code is available, compiler-level defenses can benefit from the rich
class hierarchy information available at the source level [14, 15, 41,
45]. However, various legacy applications are still in use [33] or
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proprietary binaries have to be protected which do not offer ac-
cess to the source code (e.g., Adobe Flash [10]). Here, binary-level
defenses [22, 24, 34, 36, 44] must rely on (automated) binary analy-
sis techniques to reconstruct the information needed to guarantee
security and correctness.
In this paper,we present VTable Pointer Separation (vps), a binary-
level defense against vtable hijacking attacks. Unlike previous binary-
only approaches that restrict the set of vtables permitted for each
virtual callsite, we check that the vtable pointer remains unmodi-
fied after object creation. Intuitively, vps checks the vtable pointer’s
integrity at every callsite. Because the vtable pointer in a legiti-
mate live object never changes and the virtual callsite uses it to
determine its target function, vps effectively prevents vtable hi-
jacking attacks. In essence, we want to bring a defense as powerful
as CFIXX [15] (which operates at the source level) to binary-only
applications, even though none of the information needed for the
defense is available. Our approach is suitable for binaries because,
unlike other binary-level solutions, we avoid the inherent inaccu-
racy in binary-level CFG and class hierarchy reconstruction. Be-
cause vps allows only the initial virtual pointer(s) of the object to
ever exist, we reduce the attack surface even compared to hypo-
thetical implementations of prior approaches that statically find
the set of possible vcall targets with perfect accuracy.
Given that binary-level static analysis is challenging and un-
sound in practice, and may lead to false positives in identifying vir-
tual callsites, we carefully deal with such cases by over-approxima-
ting the set of callsites and implementing an (efficient) slow path
to handle possible false positives at runtime. Meanwhile, vps han-
dles all previously verified callsite with high optimized fast checks.
This approach allows us to prevent false positives from breaking
the application as they do in existing work [22, 24, 36, 44]. Addi-
tionally, while existing work [27–29, 34] only considers directly
referenced vtables, compilers also generate code that references
vtables indirectly, e.g., through the Global Offset Table (GOT). vps
can find all code locations that instantiate objects by writing the
vtable, including objects with indirect vtable references.
Our prototype of vps is precise enough to handle complex, real-
world C++ applications such as MongoDB, MySQL server, Node.js,
and all C++ applications contained in the SPECCPU2006 and CPU2017
benchmarks. Compared to the source code based approach VTV,
which is part of GCC [41], we can on average correctly identify
97.8% and 97.4% of the virtual callsites in SPEC CPU2006 and SPEC
CPU2017, with a precision of 95.6% and 91.1%, respectively. Inter-
estingly, our evaluation also revealed 86 virtual callsites that are
not protected by VTV, even though it has access to the source
code. A further investigation with the help of the VTV maintainer
showed that this is due to a conceptual problem in VTV which re-
quires non-trivial engineering to fix. Compared to the source code
based approach CFIXX, vps shows an accuracy of 99.6% and 99.5%
on average for SPEC CPU2006 and CPU2017 with a precision of
97.0% and 96.9%. These comparisons show that vps’s binary-level
protection of virtual callsites closely approaches that of source-
level solutions. While this still leaves a small attack window, it
further closes the gap between binary-only and source-level ap-
proaches making vtable hijacking attempts mostly impractical.
Compared to state-of-the-art binary-level analysis frameworks
like Marx [34], our analysis identifies 26.5% more virtual callsites
in SPECCPU2017 and thus offers improved protection. vps induces
geomean performance overhead of 9% for all C++ applications in
SPEC CPU2017 and 11% for SPEC CPU2006, which is slightly more
than Marx induces but with significantly better protection.
Contributions. We provide the following contributions:
• We present vps, a binary-only defense against vtable hijack-
ing attacks that sidesteps the imprecision problems of prior
work on this topic. The key insight is that vtable pointers
only change during initialization and destruction of an ob-
ject (never in between), a property that vps can efficiently
enforce.
• We develop an instrumentation approach that is capable of
handling false positives in the identification of C++ virtual
callsites which would otherwise break the application and
which most existing work ignores. Unlike prior work, we
also handle indirect vtable references.
• Our evaluation shows that our binary-level instrumentation
protects nearly the same number of virtual callsites as the
source-level defenses VTV and CFIXX. In addition, our eval-
uation uncovered a conceptual problem causing false nega-
tives in VTV (part of gcc).
We will release our vps implementation and the data we used
for the evaluation as open source once this paper is published.
2 C++ AT THE BINARY LEVEL
This section provides background on C++ internals needed to un-
derstand how vps handles C++ binaries. We focus on how high-
level C++ constructs translate to the binary level. For a more de-
tailed overview of high-level C++ concepts, we refer to the corre-
sponding literature [11].
2.1 Virtual Function Tables
C++ supports the paradigm of object-oriented programming (OOP)
with polymorphism and (multiple) inheritance. A class can inherit
functions and fields from another class. The class that inherits is
called the derived class and the class from which it inherits is the
base class. In addition to single inheritance (one class inherits from
one other class), C++ also allows multiple inheritance, where a de-
rived class has multiple base classes. A base class can declare a
function as virtual, which allows derived classes to override it with
their own implementations. Programmers may choose not to im-
plement some functions in a base class, so called pure virtual func-
tions. Classes containing such functions are abstract classes and
cannot be instantiated. Classes deriving from an abstract base can
only be instantiated if they override all pure virtual functions.
Polymorphism is implemented at the binary level using virtual
function tables (vtables) that consist of the addresses of all virtual
functions of a particular class. Each class containing at least one
virtual function has a vtable. Instantiated classes (called objects)
hold a pointer to their corresponding vtable, which is typically
stored in read-only memory. Since each class has its own corre-
sponding vtable, it can also be considered as the type of the object.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the pointer to a vtable as a vt-
blptr , while the pointer to the object is called thisptr .
VPS: Excavating High-Level C++ Constructs from
Low-Level Binaries to Protect Dynamic Dispatching ACSAC ’19, December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA
Figure 1: Example C++ class structure. The code at the top
shows base classes A and B; derived class C which overrides
virtual functions funcA1 and funcB2. The bottom shows the
binary-level structure of objects of classes B and C.
The Itanium C++ ABI [5] defines the vtable layout for Linux sys-
tems.1 The vtblptr points to the first function entry in the vtable,
and the vtable contains an entry for each virtual function (either
inherited or newly declared) in the class. For example, in Figure 1,
class B’s vtable contains two function entries because the class
implements virtual functions funcB1 and funcB2. Class C inher-
its from two classes, A and B, and therefore has two vtables (a
base vtable and one sub-vtable). The base vtable contains all vir-
tual functions inherited from class A and implemented by class C.
The sub-vtable is a copy of class B’s vtable with a special entry that
refers to the overwritten virtual function (called a thunk). Preced-
ing the function entries, a vtable has two metadata fields: Runtime
Type Identification (RTTI) and Offset-to-Top. RTTI holds a pointer
to type information about the class. Among other things, this type
information contains the name of the class and its base classes.
However, RTTI is optional and often omitted by the compiler. It
is only needed when the programmer uses, e.g., dynamic_cast or
type_info. Hence, a reliable static analysis cannot rely on this in-
formation. Classes that do not contain RTTI have the RTTI field
1Linux uses the Itanium C++ ABI for x86-64 (amd64), our target architecture.
set to zero. Offset-to-Top is needed when a class uses multiple in-
heritance (hence has a base vtable and one or more sub-vtables)
as class C does. Offset-to-Top specifies the distance between a sub-
vtable’s own vtblptr and the base vtblptr at the beginning of the
object. In our example, the vtblptr to class C’s sub-vtable resides at
offset 0x10 in the object, while the vtblptr to the base vtable resides
at offset 0x0. Hence, the distance between the two, as stored in the
Offset-to-Top field in sub-vtable C, is -0x10. Offset-to-Top is 0 if
the vtable is the base vtable of the class or no multiple inheritance
is used.
Vtables can contain one additional field, calledVirtual-Base-Offset,
but it is only used in case of virtual inheritance, an advanced C++
feature for classes that inherit from the same base multiple times
(diamond-shaped inheritance). An explanation is out of scope here
because vps needs no adaptations to support virtual inheritance, so
we defer to the ABI [5].
2.2 C++ Object Initialization and Destruction
Because vps secures virtual callsites by protecting the vtblptr set at
initialization time, we explain object initialization of classes with
vtables. For the remainder of this paper, we only consider classes
and objects that have at least one virtual function and therefore a
vtable.
During object instantiation, the vtblptr is written into the object
by the constructor. The lower part of Figure 1 depicts an object’s
memory layout at the binary level. The vtblptr is at offset 0x0, the
start of the object. For classes with multiple inheritance, the con-
structor also initializes vtblptrs to the sub-vtable(s). In addition, the
programmer may initialize class-specific fields in the constructor.
These fields are located after the vtblptr and, in case of multiple
inheritance, after any sub-vtblptrs.
For classes that have one or more base classes, the constructors
of the base classes are called before the derived class’s own initial-
ization code. As a result, the base class places its vtblptr into the
object, which is subsequently overwritten by the derived class’s vt-
blptr . Depending on the optimization level, constructors are often
inlined, which may complicate binary analysis that aims to detect
constructors.
An analogous principle is applied for object destruction through
destructor functions. However, the destructors are executed in re-
versed order (destructor of the base class is executed last).
Abstract classes form a special case: although programmers can-
not instantiate abstract classes, and despite the fact that their vta-
bles contain pure_virtual function entries, the compiler can still
emit code that writes the vtblptr to an abstract class into an object.
However, this happens only when creating or releasing an object
of a derived class, and the abstract vtblptr is immediately overwrit-
ten.
2.3 C++ Virtual Function Dispatch
Because classes can override virtual functions, the compiler cannot
determine the target of a call to such a function at compile time.
Therefore, the emitted binary code uses an indirect function call
through the vtable of the object. This is called a virtual function
call, or vcall for short. In the Itanium C++ ABI [5], the compiler
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Table 1: C++ binary-only mitigation mechanisms
Defense Binary-only
Protects
vcalls
Protects
type
Protects
dangl. ptrs
Tolerates
FP vcalls
Security Strategy
Marx (VTable) [34] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ vtblptr in reconstructed class hierarchy (fallback PathArmor [43]).
Marx (Type-safe) [34] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ n.a. Memory allocator uses class hierarchy as type.
vfGuard [36] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ Call target resides in at least one vtable at correct offset.
T-VIP [24] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ vtblptr and random vtable entry must point to read-only memory.
VTint [44] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ Verifies vtable ID, vtable must be in read-only memory.
VCI [22] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ vtblptr must be statically found, in class hierarchy, or vfGuard-allowed.
VTPin [38] needs RTTI ✗ ✗ ✓ n.a. Overwrites vtblptr when object freed.
VPS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Check at vcall if object was created at a legitimate object creation site.
emits the following structure:
mov RDI, thisptr
call [vtblptr + offset]
The thisptr is an implicit call argument, so it is moved into the
first argument register, which is RDI on Linux x86-64 systems. Next,
the call instruction uses the vtblptr to fetch the target function
address from the object’s vtable. The offset added to the vtblptr
selects the correct vtable entry. Note that the offset is a constant,
so that corresponding virtual function entries must be at the same
offset in all vtables of classes that inherit from the same base class.
The same code structure holds for cases that use multiple inher-
itance. Depending on which (sub-)vtable the virtual function entry
resides in, the vtblptr either points to the base vtable or one of the
sub-vtables. However, if the vtblptr points to a sub-vtable, thisptr
does not point to the beginning of the object, but rather to the off-
set in the object where the used vtblptr lies. Consider the example
from Figure 1: when a function in the sub-vtable of class C is called,
the call uses the vtblptr to its sub-vtable, and the thisptr points to
offset 0x10 of the object. Because the code structure is the same,
the program treats calls through sub-vtables and base vtables as
analogous.
2.4 Threat Model: VTable Hijacking Attacks
As we explained in Section 2.3, virtual callsites use the vtblptr to
extract the pointer to the called virtual function. Since the object
that stores the vtblptr is dynamically created during runtime and
resides in writable memory, an attacker can overwrite it and hijack
the control flow at a virtual callsite.
The attacker has two options to hijack an object, depending
on the available vulnerabilities: leveraging a vulnerability to over-
write the object directly in memory, or using a dangling pointer to
an already deleted object by allocating attacker-controlled mem-
ory at the same position (e.g., via a use-after-free vulnerability). In
the first case, the attacker can directly overwrite the object’s vtblptr
and use it to hijack the control flow at a vcall. In the second case,
the attacker does not need to overwrite any memory; instead, the
vulnerability causes a virtual callsite to use a still existing pointer
to a deleted memory object. The attacker can control the vtblptr by
allocating new memory at the same address previously occupied
by the deleted object.
We assume the attacker has an arbitrary memory read/write
primitive, and that theW ⊕ X defense is in place as well as the
vtables reside in read-only memory. These are standard assump-
tions in related work [9, 22, 41, 44]. The attacker’s goal is to hijack
the control flow at a virtual callsite (forward control-flow transfer).
Attacks targeting the backward control-flow transfer (e.g., return
address overwrites) can be secured, for example, by shadow stacks
which are orthogonal to vps and thus out of scope. Furthermore,
data-only attacks are also out of scope.
2.5 Related Work on Binary-only Defenses
Here, we briefly compare our design against binary-only related
work as shown in Table 1. A detailed discussion including source-
level approaches is provided in Section 9.
Most existing vtable hijacking defenses assign a set of allowed
target functions to each virtual callsite (e.g., Marx VTable Protec-
tion [34], vfGuard [36], T-VIP [24], VTint [44] and VCI [22]). The
inaccuracy of binary analysis forces them to overestimate the tar-
get set, leaving room for attacks [39]. In contrast, vps enforces that
vtable pointers remain unmodified after object construction, ensur-
ing that only validly created objects can be used at virtual callsites
and reducing the attack surface even compared to a hypothetical
defense with a perfect set of allowed targets.Marx Type-safe Object
Reuse and VTPin [38] protect against the reuse of dangling pointers
by modifying the memory allocator. vps protects against dangling
pointers without any further modification.
As the comparison in Table 1 shows, vps combines the protec-
tion targets given by related work and additionally protects the
type integrity of the object itself.
3 VTABLE POINTER SEPARATION
Our approach is based on the observation that the vtblptr is only
written during object initialization and destruction and cannot le-
gitimately change in between. Therefore, only the vtblptr that is
written by the constructor (or destructor) is a valid value. If a vt-
blptr changes between the object was created and destroyed, a
vtable hijacking attack is in progress. Since these attacks target
virtual callsites, it is sufficient to check at each virtual callsite if
the vtblptr written originally into the object still resides there.
Figure 2 depicts the differences between a traditional applica-
tion and a vps-protected application. The traditional application
initializes an object and uses a vcall and the created object to call
a virtual function. As explained in Section 2.3, the application uses
the vtable to decidewhich virtual function to execute. If an attacker
is able to corrupt the object between the initialization and vcall, she
can place her own vtable in memory and hijack the control flow. In
contrast, the vps-protected application adds two additional func-
tionalities to the executed code. While the object is initialized, it
stores the vtblptr in a safe memory region. Before a vcall, it checks
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Figure 2: High-level overview of the object instantiation and virtual callsite of a traditional application (left side) and a vps
protected application (right side). For both applications the memory state is given while the instruction pointer executes the
function call.
if the vtblptr in the object is still the same as the one stored for
the object in the safe memory region. The vcall is only executed
when the check succeeds. As a result, the same attacker that is able
to corrupt the object in between can no longer hijack the control
flow. The same concept holds for vtblptrs written in the destructors.
The vtblptr is written into the object and used for vcalls during its
destruction (if it is used at all). Since a vps-protected application
stores the written vtblptr into the safe memory region and checks
the integrity of the one in the object if it is used at a vcall, the ap-
proach does not need to differentiate between object initialization
and destruction.
In contrast to other binary-only defenses for virtual callsites [22,
24, 34, 36, 44] that allow a specific overestimated set of classes at
a virtual function dispatch, vps has a direct mapping between an
object initialization site and the reachable vcalls.
Even though vps looks conceptually similar to CFIXX, adding
this protection at the binary level encounters multiple hurdles. Per-
forming accurate analysis at the binary level is a challenging prob-
lem, especially with regards to object creation sites, where false
negatives would break the protected application. Our analysis has
to take direct and indirect vtable accesses into account, which do
not exist on the source level. The virtual callsite identification has
to be as precise as possible in order to provide a high level of se-
curity and it has to be performed without type information. Any
false positive in this result breaks the application, which makes an
instrumentation capable of handling these necessary (a problem
that other binary-only approaches do not consider).
4 ANALYSIS APPROACH
vps protects binary C++ applications against control-flow hijack-
ing attacks at virtual callsites. To this end, we first analyze the
binary to identify C++-specific properties and then apply instru-
mentation to harden it. We divide the analysis into three phases:
Vtable Identification, Vtable Pointer Write Operations, and Virtual
Callsite Identification. At a high-level, our analysis first identifies
all vtables in the target binary in the Vtable Identification phase.
Subsequently, the identified vtables are used to find all locations in
the binary that write vtblptrs. Eventually, the identified vtables are
also used to identify and verify vcalls in the Virtual Callsite Identi-
fication phase. While the Vtable Identification static analysis is an
improved and more exact version of Pawlowski et al. [34] (finding
vtables in .bss and GOT, considering indirect referencing of vta-
bles), the other analyses are novel to vps. In the remainder of this
section, we explain the details of our analysis approach. Note that
we focus on Linux x86-64 binaries that use the ItaniumC++ABI [5].
However, our analysis approach is conceptually mostly generic
and with additional engineering effort can be applied to other ar-
chitectures and ABIs as well. For architecture-specific steps in our
analysis, we describe what to modify to port the step to other ar-
chitectures.
4.1 Vtable Identification
To protect vtblptrs in objects, we need to know the location of all
vtables in the binary. To find these, our static analysis searches
through the binary and uses a set of rules to identify vtables.When-
ever all rules are satisfied, the algorithm identifies a vtable. As ex-
plained earlier, Figure 1 shows a typical vtable structure. The small-
est possible vtable in the Itanium C++ABI [5] consists of three con-
secutive words (Offset-to-Top, RTTI, and Function-Entry). We use
the following five rules to determine the beginning of a vtable:
R-1. In principle, our algorithm searches for vtables in read-only
sections such as .rodata and .data.rel.ro. However, there are
exceptions to this. If a class has a base class that resides in another
module and the compiler uses copy relocation, the loader will copy
the vtable into the .bss section [25]. Additionally, vtables from
other modules can be referenced through the Global Offset Table
(GOT), e.g., in position-independent code [3]. To handle these cases
where the vtable data lies outside the main binary, we parse the bi-
nary’s dynamic symbol table and search for vtables that are either
copied to the .bss section or referenced through the GOT. Note
that we do not rely on debugging symbols, only on symbols that
the loader uses, which cannot be stripped.
R-2. Recall that the vtblptr points to the first function entry in
a class’s vtable, and is written into the object at initialization time.
Therefore, our algorithm looks for code patterns that reference this
first function entry. Again, there are special cases to handle. The
compiler sometimes emits code that does not reference the first
function entry of the vtable, but rather the firstmetadata field at off-
set -0x10 (or -0x18 if virtual inheritance is used). This happens for
example in position-independent code. To handle these cases, we
additionally look for code patterns that add 0x10 (or 0x18) to the
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reference before writing the vtblptr into the object, which is neces-
sary to comply with the Itanium C++ ABI [5]. Our algorithm also
checks for the special case where vtables are referenced through
the GOT instead of directly.
R-3. As depicted in Figure 1, the Offset-to-Top is stored in the
first metadata field of the vtable at offset -0x10. In most cases this
field is 0, but when multiple inheritance is used, this field gives the
distance between the base vtblptr and the sub-vtblptr in the object
(see Section 2.1). Our algorithm checks the sanity of this value by
allowing a range between -0xFFFFFF and 0xFFFFFF, as proposed
by Prakash et al. [36].
R-4. The RTTI field at offset -0x8 in the vtable, which can hold
a pointer to RTTI metadata, is optional and usually omitted by the
compiler. If omitted, this field holds 0; otherwise, it holds a pointer
into the data section or a relocation entry if the class inherits from
another class in a shared object.
R-5. Most of the vtable consists of function entries that hold
pointers to virtual functions. Our algorithm deems them valid if
they point into any of the .text, .plt, or .extern sections of
the binary, or are a relocation entry.
Abstract classes are an edge case. For each virtual function with-
out implementation, the vtable points to a special function called
pure_virtual. Because abstract classes are not meant to be instan-
tiated, calling pure_virtual throws an exception. Additionally, the
first function entries in a vtable can be0 if the compiler did not emit
the code of the corresponding functions (e.g., for destructor func-
tions). To cope with this, Pawlowski et al. [34] allow 0 entries in
the beginning of a vtable. We omit this rule because our approach
can safely ignore the instantiation of abstract classes, given that
vtblptrs for abstract classes are overwritten shortly after object ini-
tialization.
In case of multiple inheritance, we do not distinguish between
vtables and sub-vtables. That is, in the example in Figure 1, our
approach identifies Vtable C and Sub-Vtable C as separate vtables.
As discussed later, this does not pose any limitations for our ap-
proach given our focus on vtblptr write operations (as opposed to
methods that couple class hierarchies to virtual call sites).
The combination of multiple inheritance and copy relocation
poses another edge case. In copy relocation, the loader copies data
residing at the position given by a relocation symbol into the .bss
section without regards to the type of the data. For classes that use
multiple inheritance, the copied data contains a base vtable and
sub-vtable(s), but the corresponding relocation symbol holds only
information on the beginning and length of the data, not the vtable
locations. To ensure that we do not miss any, we identify every 8-
byte aligned address of the copied data as a vtable. For example, if
the loader copies a data chunk of 0x40 bytes to the address 0x100,
we identify the addresses 0x100, 0x108, 0x110, . . . up to 0x138 as
vtables.While this overestimates the set of vtables, only the correct
vtables and sub-vtables are referenced during object initialization.
Note that on other architectures, the assumed size of 8-byte per
vtable entry as used by our rules may have to be adjusted. For ex-
ample, Linux on x86 (32-bit) and ARM would use 4-byte entries,
with no conceptual changes.
4.2 Vtable Pointer Write Operations
The next phase of our static analysis is based on the observation
that to create a new object, its vtblptr has to be written into the cor-
responding memory object during the initialization. This is done
in the constructor of the class which can be either an explicit func-
tion or inlined code. The same holds for object destruction by the
corresponding destructor function. Hence, the goal of this analysis
step is to identify the exact instruction that writes the vtblptr into
the memory object. This step is Linux-specific but architecture-
agnostic.
First, we search for all references from code to the vtables identi-
fied in the previous step. Because vtables are not always referenced
directly, the analysis searches for the following different reference
methods:
(1) A direct reference to the start of the function entries in the
vtable. This is the most common case.
(2) A reference to the beginning of the metadata fields in the
vtable. This is mostly used by applications compiled with
position-independent code (e.g., MySQL server which addi-
tionally uses virtual inheritance).
(3) An indirect reference through the GOT. Here, the address
to the vtable is loaded from the GOT.
Starting from the identified references, we track the data flow
through the code (using Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [20])
to the instructions that write the vtblptrs during object initializa-
tion or destruction. We later instrument these instructions, adding
code that stores the vtblptr in a safe memory region. Our approach
is agnostic to the location the C++ object resides in (i.e., heap,
stack, or global memory). Furthermore, since we focus on refer-
ences from code to the vtables, our approach can handle explicit
constructor functions as well as inlined constructors and destruc-
tors.
During our research, we encountered functionswith inlined con-
structorswhere the compiler emits code that stores the vtblptr tem-
porarily in a stack variable to use it at multiple places in the same
function. Therefore, to ensure that we do notmiss any vtblptr write
instructions, our algorithm continues to track the data flow even
after a vtblptr is written into a stack variable. Because we cannot
easily distinguish between a temporary stack variable and an ob-
ject residing on the stack, our algorithm also assumes that the tem-
porary stack variable is a C++ object. While this overestimates the
set of C++ objects, it ensures that we instrument all vtblptr write
instructions, making this overapproximation comprehensive.
4.3 Virtual Callsite Identification
Because vps specifically protects vcalls against control-flow hijack-
ing, we first have to locate them in the target binary. Hence, we
have to differentiate between vcalls and normal C-style indirect
call instructions. We follow a two-stage approach to make this
distinction: we first locate all possible vcall candidates and subse-
quently verify them. The verification step consists of a static anal-
ysis component and a dynamic one. In the following, we explain
this analysis in detail.
4.3.1 Virtual CallsiteCandidates. Tofind virtual callsite candidates,
we use a similar technique as previous work [22, 24, 36, 44]. We
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search for the vcall pattern described in Section 2.3, where the
thisptr is the first argument (stored in the RDI register on Linux
x86-64) to the called function and the vcall uses the vtblptr to re-
trieve the call target from the vtable. Note that the thisptr is also
used to extract the vtblptr for the call instruction. A typical vcall
looks as follows:
mov RDI, thisptr
mov vtblptr, [thisptr]
call [vtblptr + offset]
Note that these instructions do not have to be consecutive in the
application, but can be interspersed with other instructions. Two
patterns can be derived from this sequence: the first argument reg-
ister always holds the thisptr , and the call instruction target can
be denoted as [[thisptr] + offset], where offset can be 0 and
therefore omitted. This specific dependency between call target
and first argument register is rare for non-C++ indirect calls. With
the help of the SSA form, our algorithm traces the data flow of the
function. If the previously described dependency is satisfied, we
consider the indirect call instruction a vcall candidate.
Note that the same pattern holds for classes with multiple inher-
itance. As described in Section 2.3, when a virtual function of a sub-
vtable is called, the thisptr is moved to the position in the object
where the sub-vtable resides. Therefore, the first argument holds
thisptr + distance, and the call target [[thisptr + distance]
+ offset]. This still satisfies the aforementioned dependency be-
tween first argument and call target. Furthermore, the pattern also
applies to Linux ARM, Linux x86, andWindows x86-64 binaries, re-
quiring only a minor modification to account for the specific regis-
ter or memory location used for the first argument on the platform
(R0 for ARM, the first stack argument for Linux x86, and RCX for
Windows x86-64).
To effectively protect vcalls, it is crucial to prevent false positive
vcall identifications, as these may break the application during in-
strumentation. This is also required for relatedwork [22, 24, 36, 44].
While the authors of prior approaches report no false positives
with the above vcall identification approach, our research shows
that most larger binary programs do indeed contain patterns that
result in indirect calls being wrongly classified as virtual callsites.
A possible explanation for the lack of false positives in previous
work is that most prior work focuses on Windows x86 [24, 36, 44],
where the calling conventions for vcalls and other call instructions
differ. That is, on Windows x86, the thisptr is passed to the virtual
function via the ECX register (thiscall calling convention), while
other call instructions pass the first argument via the stack (std-
call calling convention) [23]. This is not the case for Windows x86-
64 and Linux (x86 and x86-64). On these architectures, the thisptr
is passed as the first argument in the platform’s standard calling
convention (Microsoft x64, cdecl and System V AMD64 ABI, respec-
tively). While Elsabagh et al. [22], who work on Linux x86, did not
report false positives, our evaluation does show false positives in
the same application set. We contacted the authors, but they could
not help us find an explanation for these differing outcomes and
could not give us access to the source code to allow us to reproduce
the results.
4.3.2 Virtual Callsite Verification. Because a single false positive
can break our approach, the next phase in our static analysis ver-
ifies the virtual callsite candidates. Basically, we perform a data-
flow analysis in which we track whether a vtblptr is used at a vir-
tual callsite candidate. If the candidate uses the vtblptr to deter-
mine the call target, we consider it as verified. However, a data-flow
graph alone is not sufficient to verify this connection. The control
flow and actual usage of the vtblptr have also to be considered. The
following describes our analysis in detail.
Data-Flow Graphs. First, our analysis tracks the data flow back-
wards with the help of SSA form starting from all vtable references
in the code (which create the vtblptr). The data flow is tracked over
function boundaries when argument registers or the return value
register RAX are involved. This means the tracking is done inter-
procedurally. The same data-flow tracking is done for the call tar-
get of each virtual callsite candidate. As a result, we obtain data-
flow graphs showing the source of the data used by the vtable-
referencing instructions and the virtual callsite candidates. When-
ever a data-flow graph for a virtual callsite candidate has the same
data source as a vtable-referencing instruction, we group them to-
gether.
Control-Flow Path. Virtual callsite candidates and vtable-referen-
cing instructions that share the same data source represent a possi-
ble connection between a created vtblptr and a corresponding vcall.
However, this connection alone does not give any information on
whether the vtblptr is actually used at the virtual callsite candidate.
To verify this, we have to check if a control-flow path exists that
starts at the data source instruction, visits the vtable-referencing
instruction, and ends at the vcall instruction. For this, our anal-
ysis searches all possible data-flow paths through the graph that
start at a data source instruction and end in a vtable-referencing
instruction, and that start from a data source instruction and end
at a virtual callsite candidate.
Next, our analysis tries to transform these data-flow paths into a
control-flow path by translating each data-flow node into the basic
block that contains the corresponding instruction. With the help
of the Control-Flow Graph (CFG), our analysis then searches for a
path from basic block to basic block until it reaches the final block.
Eventually, if a path exists, the algorithm finds a possible control-
flow path that starts from the data source instruction, visits the
vtable-referencing instruction, and ends at the vcall instruction.
Symbolic Execution. As a last step, we symbolically execute the
obtained control-flow paths to track the flow of the vtblptr through
the binary. When an instruction writes a vtable into the memory
state, we replace that vtblptr with a symbolic value. To keep the
analysis scalable to large real-world applications, our symbolic ex-
ecution simply executes basic blocks without checking whether
branches can actually be taken in a concrete execution. If a ba-
sic block contains a call instruction that is not part of our origi-
nal data-flow path, we simply execute a return instruction imme-
diately after the call instead of symbolically executing the called
function. When the symbolic execution reaches the vcall instruc-
tion, we check the obtained memory state to verify that the vtblptr
is used for the call target. If so, we conclude that the vcall candidate
is in fact a vcall and consider it a verified vcall.
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In addition to explicit vtable-referencing instructions, this anal-
ysis phase checks implicit vtable references as well. In case the
earlier backward data-flow analysis shows that a vcall target stems
from the first argument register, we checkwhether the calling func-
tion is a known virtual function (by checking whether the function
resides in any previously identified vtable). If it is, we add a special
virtual function node to the data-flow graph. We then search for
a path from this virtual function node to the vcall instruction. If
a path is found, we apply the steps described previously for trans-
forming the data-flow path to a control-flow path. For such paths,
before starting the symbolic execution, we add an artificial mem-
ory object containing the vtblptr and place the thisptr in the first
argument register. This way, we simulate an implicit use of the
vtable through the initialized object.
We perform the whole vcall verification analysis in an iterative
manner. When the data-flow tracking step stops at an indirect call
instruction, we repeat it as soon as our analysis has verified the
indirect call as a vcall and has therefore found corresponding vta-
bles for resolving the target. The same applies to data-flow tracking
that stops at the beginning of a virtual function (because no caller
is known). As soon as we can determine a corresponding vcall in-
struction, we repeat the analysis. The analysis continues until we
reach a fixed point where the analysis fails to find any new results.
4.3.3 Dynamic Profiling. Our approach includes a dynamic pro-
filing phase that further refines the vcall verification. During this
phase, we execute the applicationwith instrumentation code added
to all virtual callsite candidates (only the vcall candidates, not the
already verified vcalls). Whenever the execution reaches a vcall,
the instrumentation code verifies that the first argument contains
a valid thisptr . To verify this, we check if the first element of the ob-
ject the thisptr points to contains a valid pointer to a known vtable
(vtblptr). If it does, we consider the vcall verified. Otherwise, we
regard the vcall as a false positive of the static analysis and discard
it.
Because this phase only instruments vcall candidates identified
by the static analysis described in Section 4.3.1, it is safe to assume
the dependency between first argument and call instruction tar-
get. Hence, the above dynamic profiling check is sufficient to re-
move false positives seen during the profiling run, given that the
odds of finding a C-style indirect callsite with such a distinctive
pattern that uses C++ objects is extremely unlikely. We did not en-
counter any such case during our comprehensive evaluation. Also
note, that only this dynamic analysis step discards vcall candidates
as false positives. Vcalls that could not be verified by the static anal-
ysis (or not reached during this dynamic profiling) are still consid-
ered vcall candidates since the reason for the failed verification
can be missing information (e.g., analysis gaps through indirect
control-flow transfers).
5 INSTRUMENTATION APPROACH
vps protects virtual callsites against control-flow hijacking attacks
by instrumenting the application using the results from the anal-
ysis phase. We instrument two parts of the program: Object Ini-
tialization and Destruction and Virtual Callsites. The following de-
scribes how both kinds of instrumentation work.
5.1 Object Initialization and Destruction
We use the data collected in Section 4.2 to instrument object initial-
ization, specifically the instruction that writes the vtblptr into the
object. When an object is created, the instrumentation code stores
a key-value pair that uses the memory address of the object as the
key and maps it to the vtblptr , which is the associated value. To
prevent tampering with this mapping, we store it in a safe mem-
ory region.
Recall that when a C++ object is created that inherits from an-
other class, the initialization code first writes the vtblptr of the base
class into the object, which is then overwritten by the vtblptr of the
derived class. Our approach is agnostic to inheritance and simply
overwrites the vtblptr in the same order (because each vtblptr write
instruction is instrumented).
Similarly, our approach is agnostic to multiple inheritance, be-
cause object initialization sites use the address where the vtblptr is
written as the object address. As explained in Section 2.3, at a vir-
tual callsite the thisptr points to the address of the object the used
vtblptr resides in. For a sub-vtable, this is not the beginning of the
object, but an offset somewhere in the object (in our running ex-
ample in Figure 1 offset 0x10). Because this is exactly the address
that our approach uses as the key for the safe memory region, our
approach works for multiple inheritance without any special han-
dling.
Since this instrumentation only focuses on vtblptr write instruc-
tions, it is also agnostic to object initialization and destruction.
Hence, we do not have to differentiate between constructor and
destructor and can use it for both.
Moreover, despite the fact that we ignore object deletion, our ap-
proach does not suffer from consistency problems. This is because,
when an object is deleted and its released memory is reused for a
new C++ object, the instrumentation code for the initialization of
this new object automatically overwrites the old value in the safe
memory region with the current vtblptr .
5.2 Virtual Callsites
Because a single false positive virtual callsite can break the appli-
cation, we designed the vcall instrumentation code such that it can
detect false positives and filter them out. In doing so, the vcall in-
strumentation continuously refines the previous analysis results.
The vcall instrumentation consists of two components, described
next: Analysis Instrumentation and Security Instrumentation.
5.2.1 Analysis Instrumentation. We add analysis instrumentation
code to all vcall candidates that we were unable to verify during
our static vcall verification and dynamic profiling analysis. For ver-
ified vcall sites, we only add security instrumentation and omit the
analysis code.
Before executing a vcall candidate, the analysis instrumentation
performs the same check as the dynamic profiling phase described
in Section 4.3.3. If the check fails, meaning that this is not a vcall
but a regular C-style indirect call, we remove all instrumentation
from the call site. If the check succeeds, we replace the analysis in-
strumentationwith themore lightweight security instrumentation
for verified virtual callsites described in Section 5.2.2, and immedi-
ately run the security instrumentation code.
VPS: Excavating High-Level C++ Constructs from
Low-Level Binaries to Protect Dynamic Dispatching ACSAC ’19, December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA
Through our use of adaptive instrumentation, our approach is
able to cope with false positives and further refine the analysis re-
sults during runtime. By caching the refined results on disk, we
can reuse these in later runs of the same application, improving
vps’s performance over time. Furthermore, caching also improves
the security of our adaptive instrumentation as we discuss in Sec-
tion 8.2.
Because the analysis instrumentation verifies all remaining vcall
candidates for false positives at runtime, the static vcall verification
from Section 4.3.2 and the dynamic profiling from Section 4.3.3 can
be omitted. Omitting these steps does not affect the correctness
of our approach, although we recommend using them for optimal
performance.
5.2.2 Security Instrumentation. Weprotect verified vcall sites against
control-flow hijacking by adding security instrumentation code
that runs before allowing the vcall. The instrumentation uses the
thisptr in the first argument register to retrieve the vtblptr stored
for this object in the safe memory region. To decide whether to al-
low the vcall, the instrumentation code compares the vtblptr from
the safe memory region with the one stored in the actual object
used in the vcall. If they are the same, the instrumentation allows
the vcall. If not, we terminate with an alert.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
Based on the approach from Section 4, we integrated our static
analysis into the open source Marx framework [34]. This frame-
work provides a basic symbolic execution based on the VEX-IR
from theValgrind project [8] and data structures needed for C++ bi-
nary analysis. It is written in C++ and targets Linux x86-64 (amd64)
binaries. To support integration of our approach into the Marx
framework, we added support for SSA and a generic data-flow
tracking algorithm.
Because the VEX-IR supports multiple architectures, the frame-
work is easily extendable to these. The same is true for our ap-
proach, which is mostly independent from the underlying architec-
ture (Section 4). To balance precision and scalability, the symbolic
execution emulates only a subset of the 64-bit VEX instructions
that suits our focus on vtable-centered data-flow tracking in real-
world applications.
We use IDAPython [4] for vtable identification and CFG extrac-
tion. Additionally, we use instruction data provided by IDA Pro
to support the SSA transformation, and use Protocol Buffers [7]
to export the results in a programming language–agnostic format.
We implement dynamic profiling with Pin [31]. We build the run-
time component of vps on top of Dyninst v9.3.2 [12]. Dyninst is re-
sponsible for installing vtblptr write and (candidate) virtual callsite
hooks. We inject these wrappers into the target program’s address
space by preloading a shared library.
To set up the safe memory region, our preloaded library maps
the lower half of the address space as a safe region at load time; this
is straightforward for position-independent executables as their
segments are mapped exclusively in the upper half of the address
space by default. To compute safe addresses, we subtract 64TB2
from the addresses used by vtblptr writes or virtual calls. To thwart
2Linux x86-64 provides 47 bits for user space mappings, and 247 = 128 TB.
value probing attacks in the safe region, we (i) mark all safe region
pages as inaccessible by default and make them accessible on de-
mand, and (ii) use a fixed offset chosen randomly at load time for
writes to the safe region. To achieve the latter, we write a random
value to the gs register and use it as the offset for all accesses to
the safe region. To mark pages as readable/writable on demand,
we use a custom segfault handler that uses mprotect to allow ac-
cesses from our library. This means that when a vtblptr is written
into the safe memory region and the page is not yet accessible, our
segfault handler checks if the write access is done by our library
and makes the page accessible if it is. Otherwise, a probing attack
is detected and execution is stopped. The page remains accessible
which speeds up further vtblptr writes to it.
We omit an evaluation of potential optimizations already ex-
plored in prior work [15, 30], such as avoiding Dyninst’s penal-
ties for (re)storing unclobbered live registers or removing tram-
poline code left over after nopping out analysis instrumentation
code. Similarly, we do not implement hash-based safe region com-
pression that would reduce virtual and physical memory usage
and allow increased entropy in the safe region, nor do we use In-
tel MPK [18] to further secure the safe region. Since we focus on
the exact analysis of binary applications and the subsequent in-
strumentation, we consider these optimizations orthogonal to our
work.
7 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate vps in terms of performance and accu-
racy. We focus our evaluation on MySQL, Node.js, MongoDB, and
the fifteenC++ benchmarks found in SPECCPU2006 and CPU2017 [1,
2]. Even though our approach is able to handle proprietary soft-
ware, we evaluate it on open source software since otherwise we
are not able to generate a ground truth to compare against.
7.1 Virtual Callsite Identification Accuracy
In order to measure the accuracy of the protection of vps, we eval-
uate the accuracy of the vcall identification analysis. The results
show that vps, although a binary-only approach, can almost reach
the same degree of protection as a source based approach. Com-
pared to the state-of-the-art binary-only approach Marx, it identi-
fies more vcalls with fewer false-positives. As applications for our
evaluation, we use the C++ programs of SPEC CPU2006 and SPEC
CPU2017 that contain virtual callsites, as well as theMySQL server
binary (5.7.21), the Node.js binary (8.10.0), and the MongoDB bi-
nary (3.2.4). We used the default optimization levels (O2 for CPU
2006, O3 for all others). The analysis was performed on Ubuntu
16.04 LTS running on an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU with 32 GB of
RAM.
VTV. In order to gain a ground truth of virtual callsites, we use
VTV [41] and compare against our analysis results. Since VTV
leverages source code information, its results are usually used as
ground truth for binary-only approaches focusing on C++ virtual
callsites. All programs except MongoDB are compiled with GCC
8.1.0. MongoDB crashed during compilation and had to be com-
piled with the older version GCC 4.9.3. Unfortunately, compiling
450.soplex results in a crash and it is therefore omitted. Table 2
shows the results of our vcall accuracy evaluation.
ACSAC ’19, December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA Pawlowski et al.
Table 2: Results of our vcall accuracy evaluation. For each application this table shows (i) the code size, time needed for the
static analysis (hh:mm:ss) and the ground truth generated by VTV; (ii) static vcall identification, depicting the number of
indirect call instructions identified as vcall that are true positives, the false positives, recall and precision; (iii) static vcall
verification results, listing the number of verified vcall instructions, verified vcalls in percent and verified false positives; (iv)
static and dynamic verification results, showing the number of verified vcall instructions, verified vcalls in percent, verified
false positives and false positive identified vcalls removed. Cases where dynamic verification failed due to VTV false positives
are in parentheses.
Static Identification Static Verification Static and Dynamic Verification
Program Code Size Time #GT #TP #FP Recall (%) Precision (%) # % #FP # % #FP # removed
447.dealII 4.18 MB 0:02:15 1,558 1,450 215 93.0 87.1 379 24.3 7 423 27.2 18 0
450.soplex – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
453.povray 1.09 MB 0:00:04 102 102 10 100.0 91.1 32 31.4 0 55 53.9 0 6
471.omnetpp 1.17 MB 0:04:00 802 800 0 99.8 100.0 245 30.6 0 530 66.1 0 0
473.astar 0.04 MB 0:00:00 1 1 0 100.0 100.0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0
483.xalancbmk 7.17 MB 5:54:25 13,440 12,915 17 96.1 99.9 2,122 15.8 0 3,792 28.2 1 0
Average [SPEC CPU2006] 97.8 95.6 20.4 35.1
510.parest_r 12.69 MB 1:00:00 4,678 4,288 528 91.7 89.0 660 14.1 13 (660) (14.1) (13) –
511.povray_r 1.20 MB 0:00:05 122 122 14 100.0 89.7 33 27.1 0 62 50.8 0 6
520.omnetpp_r 3.60 MB 0:06:57 6,430 6,190 23 96.3 99.6 1,585 24.7 0 2,286 35.6 6 0
523.xalancbmk_r 10.34 MB 15:20:40 33,880 33,069 12 97.6 100.0 1,948 5.8 0 4,961 14.6 0 0
526.blender_r 11.47 MB 0:03:29 174 172 80 98.9 68.3 66 37.9 0 70 40.2 0 49
541.leela_r 0.33 MB 0:00:01 1 1 0 100.0 100.0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0
Average [SPEC CPU2017] 97.4 91.1 18.3 25.9
MongoDB 48.22 MB 1:57:39 17,836 16,366 44 91.8 99.7 552 3.1 0 (552) (3.1) (0) –
MySQL 35.95 MB 65:57:27 11,876 11,592 179 97.6 98.5 1,330 11.2 3 (1,330) (11.2) (3) –
Node.js 38.13 MB 5:16:09 12,643 12,330 353 97.5 97.2 1,538 12.2 10 2,559 20.2 45 118
Table 3: Results of our comparison against CFIXX. For each
application this table shows (i) the ground truth generated
by CFIXX; (ii) static vcall identification, depicting the num-
ber of indirect call instructions identified as vcall that are
true positives, the false positives, recall and precision.
Static Identification
Program #GT #TP #FP Recall (%) Precision (%)
447.dealII – – – – –
450.soplex 553 553 10 100.0 98.2
453.povray 110 110 11 100.0 90.9
471.omnetpp 943 942 0 99.9 100.0
473.astar 1 1 0 100.0 100.0
483.xalancbmk 12,670 12,427 527 98.0 95.9
Average [SPEC CPU2006] 99.6 97.0
510.parest_r 7,288 7,194 265 98.7 96.5
511.povray_r 119 119 11 100.0 91.5
520.omnetpp_r 6,037 6,032 71 99.9 98.8
523.xalancbmk_r 23,661 26,407 528 98.9 97.8
526.blender_r – – – – –
541.leela_r 2 2 0 100.0 100.0
Average [SPEC CPU2017] 99.5 96.9
MongoDB 20,873 20,716 448 99.3 97.9
MySQL 13,035 12,921 380 99.1 97.1
Node.js 13,013 12,982 491 99.8 96.4
92 /**
93 * Destroy the object pointed to by a pointer
type.
94 */
95 template<typename _Tp>
96 inline void
97 _Destroy(_Tp* __pointer)
98 { __pointer->~_Tp(); }
(a) Snippet from stl_construct.h.
2545 Vector<double> us[dim];
2546 for (unsigned int i=0; i<dim; ++i)
2547 us[i].reinit (dof_handler.n_dofs());
(b) Snippet from grid_generator.cc.
Figure 3: Two source code snippets where VTV fails to iden-
tify a virtual callsite.
Overall, we observe that the analysis of vps is capable of identi-
fying the vast majority of virtual callsites in the binary. This ranges
from91.7% (510.parest_r) to all vcalls detected (several benchmarks).
Our average recall is 97.8% on SPEC CPU2006 and 97.4% on SPEC
CPU2017. With the exception of one outlier (526.blender_r with
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precision 68.3%) we have a low number of false positives, with pre-
cision ranging from 87.0% (447.dealII ) to no false positives at all
(several benchmarks). The results are similar for large real-world
applications with a recall ranging from 91.8% (MongoDB) to 97.6%
(MySQL) and a precision ranging from 97.2% (Node.js) to 99.7% (Mon-
goDB). The high recall rate shows that our binary-only approach
is able to protect almost as many virtual callsites as VTV does and
hence provides comparable security as this source based approach.
However, it still misses some vcalls which may leave an attacker
with a small room to perform an attack under the right circum-
stances. The precision rates show that althoughwe have a low false
positive identification rate, we still have some.
In order to cope with the problem of false positive identifica-
tions, we verify vcalls before we actually instrument them with
our security check. The static analysis verification is able to ver-
ify 37.9% in the best case (526.blender_r) and in the worst case
none. On average we verified 20.4% on SPEC CPU2006 and 18.3%
on SPEC CPU2017. For large applications, the best verification rate
is 12.2% (Node.js) and the worst 3.1% (MongoDB). Dynamic verifi-
cation (see Section 4.3.3) considerably improves verification per-
formance, verifying 35.1% and 25.9% for SPEC CPU2006 and 2017.
Unfortunately, we were not able to execute 510.parest_r, MySQL
and MongoDB with VTV. The applications crashed with an error
message stating that VTV was unable to verify a vtable pointer
(i.e., a false positive). Hence, the only large real-world application
with dynamic verification Node.js verified 20.2% of the vcalls.
Amanual analysis of themissed virtual callsites (false negatives)
reveals two possibilities for a miss: the data flow was too complex
to be handled correctly by our implementation, or the described
pattern in Section 4.3.1 was not used. The former can be fixed by
improving the implemented algorithm that is used for finding the
described pattern. In the latter, the vtblptr is extracted from the ob-
ject, however, a newly created stack object is used as thisptr for the
virtual callsite which does not follow a typical C++ callsite pattern.
This could be addressed by considering additional vcall patterns,
at the risk of adding false positives. Given our already high recall
rates, we believe this would not be a favorable trade-off.
We also verified 86 cases which VTV did not recognize as vir-
tual callsite instructions. A manual verification of all cases show
that these are indeed vcall instructions and hence missed virtual
callsites by VTV. For example, Figure 3a depicts the relevant code
for 34 of these cases that are linked to the compiler provided file
stl_construct.h. Line 98 provides the missed vcall instruction
that calls the destructor of the provided object. Since the destructor
of a class is also a virtual function, it is invoked with the help of a
virtual callsite. Another example is given in Figure 3b for 510.parest_r.
Here a vector is created and the function reinit() is invoked on
line 2547. However, since the class dealii::Vector<double> is
provided by the application and reinit() is a virtual function of
this class, this function call is translated into a virtual callsite. We
contacted the VTV authors about this issue and they confirmed
that this happens because the compiler accesses the memory of
the objects directlywhen calling the virtual function in the internal
intermediate representation. Usually, the compiler accesses them
while going through an internal vtblptr field. Unfortunately, to fix
this issue in VTV would require a lot of non-trivial work since the
analysis has to be enhanced.
Table 4: Results of Marx’s vcall accuracy evaluation. For
each application this table shows (i) the ground truth gen-
erated by VTV; (ii) static vcall identification, depicting the
number of indirect call instructions identified as vcall that
are true positives, the false positives, recall and precision.
Static Identification
Program #GT #TP #FP Recall (%) Precision (%)
447.dealII 1,558 1,307 122 83.9 91.5
450.soplex – – – – –
453.povray 102 98 10 96.1 90.7
471.omnetpp 802 701 3 87.4 99.6
473.astar 1 1 0 100.0 100.0
483.xalancbmk – – – – –
Average [SPEC CPU2006] 91.8 95.4
510.parest_r 4,678 3,673 295 78.5 92.6
511.povray_r 122 115 11 94.3 91.3
520.omnetpp_r 6,430 5,465 22 85.0 99.6
523.xalancbmk_r 33,880 23,541 33 69.4 99.9
526.blender_r 174 171 1,347 98.3 11.3
541.leela_r 1 0 0 0.0 0.0
Average [SPEC CPU2017] 70.9 65.8
MongoDB 17,836 12,437 1,249 69.7 90.9
MySQL 11,876 10,867 1,214 81.3 88.8
Node.js 12,643 10,648 1,095 84.2 90.7
CFIXX. Since CFIXX performs the enforcement in a similar way,
we also evaluated our binary-only approach against this source
codebasedmethod.Hence, we compiled the applicationswithCFIXX
which is based on LLVM and extracted the protected virtual call-
sites as ground truth for our comparison. Table 3 shows the re-
sults of this evaluation. Unfortunately, we were not able to compile
447.dealII and 526.blender_r with CFIXX. As the table shows, vps
can identify on average 99.6% of all SPEC CPU2006 and 99.5% of
SPEC CPU2017 virtual callsites that are also protected by CFIXX.
Furthermore, vps also yields a high precision with 97.0% for SPEC
CPU2006 and 96.9% for SPEC CPU2017 on average. For large real-
world applications, the recall and precision rates are similar with
a recall of 99.1% for MySQL and 99.8% for Node.js and a precision
of 97.1% and 96.4% respectively. A manual analysis of the missed
virtual callsites (false negatives) showed the same two reasons for
a miss that also occurred for VTV.
Marx. A direct comparison of the accuracy with other binary-
only approaches is difficult since different test sets are used to
evaluate it. For example, vfGuard evaluates the accuracy of their
approach against only two applications, while T-VIP is only evalu-
ated against one. VTint states absolute numbers without any com-
parison with a ground truth. VCI evaluates their approach against
SPEC CPU2006, but the numbers given for the ground truth cre-
ated with VTV differ completely from ours (e.g., 9,201 vs. 13,440
vcalls for 483.xalancbmk) which makes a comparison difficult. Ad-
ditionally, the paper reports no false positives during their analysis
which we encounter in the same application set with a similar iden-
tification technique. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 4.3.1,
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Table 5: Object creation and destruction accuracy results,
showing the number of vtable references in the code as
found in the ground truth, and as identified or missed by
our analysis.
Program #GT # identified #missed
447.dealII – – –
450.soplex 102 228 0
453.povray 103 226 0
471.omnetpp 372 871 0
473.astar 0 8 0
483.xalancbmk 2,918 6,530 0
510.parest_r 12,482 25,804 0
511.povray_r 103 224 0
520.omnetpp_r 1,381 3,280 0
523.xalancbmk_r 2,790 6,323 0
526.blender_r – – –
541.leela_r 87 180 0
MongoDB 8,054 11,401 0
MySQL 8,532 11,524 0
Node.js 7,816 19,204 0
we were not able to determine the reason for this. Furthermore,
most approaches target different platforms than vps (Windows x86
and Linux x86) and are not open source. Since Marx is the only
open source approach that targets the same platform, we analyzed
our evaluation set with it. In order to create as few false positives
as possible we used its conservative mode. Unfortunately, Marx
crashed during the analysis of 483.xalancbmk. The results of the
analysis can be seen in Table 4. Compared to Marx, we have con-
siderably higher recall with better precision. Averaged over the
CPU2006 benchmarks supported by Marx, vps achieves 98.2% re-
call (91.8% for Marx) and on CPU2017 97.4% versus 70.9%, respec-
tively. This does not come at the cost of more false positives, as our
precision is similar on CPU2006 (94.5% vs. 95.4%) and much better
on CPU2017 (91.1% vs. 65.8%). For large real-world applications
likeMySQL andMongoDB, vps identifies 16.3% and 28.1% more vir-
tual callsites with better precision (98.5% vs. 88.8% forMySQL and
99.7% vs. 90.9% for MongoDB).
Overall, our analysis shows that vps is precise enough to pro-
vide an application with protection against control-flow hijacking
attacks at virtual callsites. The evaluation showed that on aver-
age only 2.5% when comparing against VTV and 0.5% comparing
against CFIXX of the vcalls were missed. Since binary analysis is
a hard problem, the results are very promising in showing that a
sophisticated analysis can almost reach the same degree of protec-
tion as a source based approach. In addition, it shows that even
source code approaches such as VTV do not find all virtual callsite
instructions and can benefit from binary-only approaches such as
vps. Furthermore, the number of false positives shows the sensibil-
ity of our approach to handle them during instrumentation rather
than assume their absence.
7.2 Object Initialization/Destruction Accuracy
To avoid breaking applications, vps must instrument all valid ob-
ject initialization and destruction sites. To ensure that this is the
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Figure 4: Normalized runtime for C++ programs in SPEC
CPU2006 and CPU2017, with cumulative configurations: (i)
only instrument vtblptr writes; (ii) also instrument virtual
call instructions; (iii) secure the safe region by marking all
pages unwritable, and only selectively mprotect-ing them if
they are accessed from our own instrumentation code; and
(iv) include offline dynamic analysis results, reducing the
need for hot-patching.
case, we compare the number of vtable-referencing instructions
found by vps to a ground truth. We generate the ground truth
with an LLVM 4.0.0 pass that instruments Clang’s internal func-
tion CodeGenFunction::InitializeVTablePointer(), which
Clang uses for all vtable pointer initialization.
Table 5 shows the results for the same set of applications we
used in Section 7.1. We omit results for 447.dealII from SPEC CPU
2006 and 526.blender_r from SPEC CPU 2017 because these bench-
marks fail to compile with LLVM 4.0.0. The results for the remain-
ing applications show that our analysis finds all vtable-referencing
instructions. It conservatively overestimates the set of vtable-referencing
instructions, ensuring the security and correctness of vps at the
cost of a slight performance degradation due to the overestimated
instruction set.
7.3 Performance
This section evaluates the runtime performance of vps by measur-
ing the time it takes to run each C++ benchmark in SPEC CPU2006
and CPU2017.We compare vps-protected runtimes against the base-
line of original benchmarks without any instrumentation. We com-
pile all test cases as position-indepedent executables with GCC
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Table 6: vps performance results and runtime statistics. For each binary, this table shows (i) binary instrumentation details,
depicting the number of instrumented vtblptr writes (#vtblptr), positive virtual calls (#positive), and candidate vcalls (#candi-
dates); (ii) runtime statistics, listing the number of true positive (#TP) and false positive (#FP) virtual calls, and the total number
of virtual calls (#vcalls) and vtblptr writes (#vtblptr); and (iii) runtime overhead, listing runtime overhead (vps) compared to
the baseline (base) in seconds.
Binary instrumentation Runtime statistics Runtime overhead
#vtblptr #positive #candidates #TP #FP #vcalls #vtblptr base vps
444.namd 6 0 2 0 0 0 2,018 343.5 342.9 (+ 0%)
447.dealII 4,283 161 1,459 47 0 97m 21m 289.7 299.2 (+ 3%)
450.soplex 120 195 364 48 0 1,665,968 40 215.8 220.2 (+ 2%)
453.povray 98 21 91 21 6 101,743 162 135.8 153.3 (+13%)
471.omnetpp 507 117 677 327 0 1,585m 2,156m 290.0 370.2 (+28%)
473.astar 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 350.3 351.6 (+ 0%)
483.xalancbmk 4,554 1,348 11,623 1,639 0 3,822m 2,316m 185.0 249.4 (+35%)
Geometric mean [SPEC CPU2006] + 11%
508.namd_r 48 0 0 0 0 0 21 271.8 271.8 (+ 0%)
510.parest_r 12,206 243 4,539 350 4 2,625m 119m 586.3 603.1 (+ 3%)
511.povray_r 113 19 121 21 6 4,577 183 498.7 572.0 (+15%)
520.omnetpp_r 2,591 447 5,310 751 0 7,958m 2,070m 507.4 661.7 (+30%)
523.xalancbmk_r 4,512 801 30,771 2,844 0 4,873m 2,314m 366.8 461.5 (+26%)
526.blender_r 43 37 174 4 46 11 3 325.8 328.6 (+ 1%)
531.deepsjeng_r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 345.1 353.1 (+ 2%)
541.leela_r 177 0 2 0 0 0 404,208 535.5 534.6 (+ 0%)
Geometric mean [SPEC CPU2017] + 9%
6.3.0. For each benchmark, we report the median runtime over 11
runs on a Xeon E5-2630 with 64GB RAM, running CentOS Linux
7.4 64-bit. We use a single additional run with more logging en-
abled to obtain statistics such as the number of executed virtual
calls. Table 6 details our results.
Our results show the variety in properties of C++ applications.
Some programs make little to no use of virtual dispatching, e.g.,
444.namd, 508.namd_r, 531.deepsjeng_r, and 473.astar. Others con-
tain thousands of vtblptr writes and virtual callsites, e.g., 510.parest_r
with over 12,000 vtblptr writes, or 483.xalancbmk in CPU2006 with
more than 1,300 verified virtual callsites. Further details are shown
in the first group in Table 6.
The comparison of verified virtual calls (true positive) and regu-
lar indirect calls (false positive) shows the accuracy of our analysis.
Almost all vcall candidates turn out to be real vcalls. Furthermore,
with absolute numbers of executed virtual calls and vtblptr writes
in the billions, it is clear that our instrumentation must be light-
weight. The second group in Table 6 depicts the exact numbers.
The runtime overhead of our instrumentation varies from 0%
for programs with little to no virtual dispatch code to 35% for the
worst-case scenario (483.xalancbmk). In almost all cases, we see
a correlation between increased overhead and number of instru-
mentation points (vtblptr writes and virtual calls). An exception is
511.povray_r, which shows a 15% performance decrease despite a
relatively low number of vcalls and vtblptr writes. Further inspec-
tion shows that this is caused by the 6 false positives candidate
vcalls; if we disable hot-patching, our vcall instrumentation code
is called over 18 billion times. While we remove instrumentation
hooks for the majority of these cases, which are not real vcalls, our
current implementation does not remove the Dyninst trampolines.
These trampolines are the source of the unexpected overhead. The
numbers depicting the comparison of the uninstrumented baseline
runs to vps-protected runs are shown in the third group in Table 6.
To better understand the overhead of vps, we gathered detailed
statistics for both SPEC CPU2006 and SPEC CPU2017 in varying
configurations. We first run SPEC with only instrumentation for
vtblptr writes enabled. In this run, the entire safe region is read-
/writable and the instrumentation only (i) computes the address
in the safe region to store the vtable pointer at, and (ii) copies the
vtable pointer there. In the second configuration, we additionally
instrument virtual calls. We check whether candidates are actual
vcalls by testing the call’s first argument and, if it can be derefer-
enced, looking this value up in the list of known vtables. We then
either patch verified vcalls to enable the fast path, or remove in-
strumentation for false positives. The fast path fetches the vtable
pointer by dereferencing the first argument, and then compares it
against the value stored in the safe region. The third configuration
additionally makes the safe region read-only and uses a segfault
handler to mark pages writable on demand. Finally, the fourth con-
figuration includes dynamic analysis results, removing the need to
hot-patch previously verified vcalls at runtime. The results show
that the majority of vps’s overhead stems from (i) vtblptr writes,
and (ii) virtual callsite instrumentation. Figure 4 details the num-
bers of this evaluation.
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Overall, with a geometric mean performance overhead of 11%
for SPEC CPU2006 and 9% for SPEC CPU2017, vps shows a moder-
ate performance impact. As expected, it does not perform as well as
a source-based approach such as VTV with reported 4% geometric
mean for SPEC CPU2006 [41]. However, it outperforms compara-
ble previous work (VCI with 14% [22] and T-VIP with 25% [24])
and performs slightly worse than Marx’s VTable Protection with
a reported 8% geometric mean for SPEC CPU2006, however, with
better accuracy and additional type integrity.
8 DISCUSSION
This section first discusses the susceptibility of vps to Counterfeit
Object-oriented Programming [39]. Following this, we discuss the
limitations of vps.
8.1 Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming
CFI approaches targeting C++ must cope with advanced attackers
using Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP) attacks
[19, 39]. This attack class thwarts defenses that do not accurately
model C++ semantics. As we argue below, vps reduces the attack
surface sufficiently that practical COOP attacks are infeasible.
For a successful COOP attack, an attacker must control a con-
tainer filled with objects, with a loop invoking a virtual function
on each object. The loop may be an actual loop, called a main loop
gadget, or can be achieved through recursion, called a recursion
gadget. We refer to both types as loop gadget. The attacker places
counterfeit objects in the container, allowing them to hijack con-
trol flow when the loop executes each object’s virtual function. To
pass data between the objects, the attacker can overlap the objects’
fields.
The first restriction vps imposes on an attacker is that it pre-
vents filling the container with counterfeit objects; because the
objects were not created at legitimate object creation sites, the
safe memory does not contain stored vtblptrs for them. Only two
conceivable ways would allow an attacker to craft a container of
counterfeit objects under vps: either the application allows attack-
ers to arbitrarily invoke constructors and create objects, or the at-
tacker can coax the application into creating all objects needed for
an attack through legitimate behavior. The former occurs (in re-
stricted form) only in applications with scripting capabilities. The
latter scenario, besides requiring an cooperative victim application,
hinges on the attacker’s ability to scan data memory to find all
needed objects without crashing the application (hence losing the
created objects) and filling the container with pointers to these.
The second restriction vps imposes is that it prohibits overlap-
ping objects (used for data transfer in COOP) because objects can
only be created through legitimate constructors. This means that
a would-be COOP attack would have to pass data via argument
registers or via a scratch memory area instead. Data passing via
argument registers works only if the loop gadget does not modify
the argument registers between gadget invocations. Additionally,
the virtual functions used as gadgets must leave their results in
precisely the correct argument registers when they return. Pass-
ing data via scratch memory limits the attack to the use of virtual
functions that work on memory areas. The pointer to the scratch
memory area must then be passed to the virtual function gadgets
either via an argument register (subject to the limitations of pass-
ing data via argument registers), or via a field in the object. To use
a field in the object as a pointer to scratch memory, the attacker
must overwrite that field prior to the attack, which could lead to a
crash if the application tries to use the modified object.
As a third restriction, vps’s checks of the vtblptr at each vcall
instruction mean that the attacker is limited in the virtual func-
tions they can use at a loop gadget. Only the virtual function at the
specific vtable offset used by the vcall is allowed; attackers cannot
“shift” vtables to invoke alternative entries. This security policy is
comparable to vfGuard [36].
To summarize, vps restricts three crucial COOP components:
object creation, data transfer, and loop gadget selection. Because
all proof-of-concept exploits by Schuster et al. [39] rely on object
overlapping as a means of transferring data, vps successfully pre-
vents them. Moreover, Schuster et al. recognize vfGuard as a signif-
icant constraint for an attacker performing a COOP attack. Given
that vps raises the bar even more than vfGuard, we argue that vps
makes currently existing COOP attacks infeasible.
We found that multiple of the virtual callsites missed by VTV (as
shown in Section 7.1) reside in a loop in a destructor function (sim-
ilar to the main loop gadget example used by Schuster et al. [39]).
Because the loop iterates over a container of objects and uses a vir-
tual call on each object, COOP attacks can leverage these missed
callsites as amain loop gadget even with VTV enabled. This demon-
strates the need for defense-in-depth, with multiple hurdles for an
attacker to cross in case of inaccuracies in the analysis.
8.2 Limitations
At the moment, our proof-of-concept implementation of the in-
strumentation ignores object deletion because it does not affect
the consistency of the safe memory. As a result, when an object is
deleted, its old vtblptr is still stored in safe memory. If an attacker
manages to control thememory of the deleted object, they can craft
a new object that uses the same vtable as the original object. Be-
cause the vtblptr remains unchanged, this attack is analogous to
corrupting an object’s fields and does not allow the attacker to hi-
jack control. Thus, while our approach does not completely pre-
vent use-after-free, it forces an attacker to re-use the type of the
object previously stored in the attacked memory.
Another limitation of our approach lies in the runtime verifica-
tion of candidate vcall sites. If an attacker uses an unverified vcall
instruction, they can force the analysis instrumentation to detect a
“false positive” vcall and remove the security instrumentation for
this instruction, leaving the vcall unprotected. Because we cache
analysis results, this attack onlyworks for vcall sites that are unver-
ified in the static analysis and have never been executed before in
any run of the program (since otherwise only the security check is
performed), leading to a race condition between the analysis instru-
mentation and the attacker. The only way to mitigate this issue is
by improving coverage during the dynamic profiling analysis and
therefore reducing the number of unverified vcalls. This is possible
by running test cases for the protected program or through tech-
niques such as fuzzing [6, 37]. Note also that this attack requires
specific knowledge of an unverified vcall; if the attacker guesses
wrong and attacks a known vcall, we detect and log the attack.
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vps inherits some limitations from Dyninst, such as Dyninst’s
inability to instrument functions that catch or throw C++ excep-
tions, and Dyninst’s inability to instrument functions for which it
fails to reconstruct a CFG. These limitations are not fundamental
to vps and can be resolved with additional engineering effort.
Finally, we note that our safe memory region implementation
can be enhanced, for example, by using hardware features such as
Memory Protection Keys (MPK) [18]. In the current implementa-
tion, an adversary might still be able to overwrite values in the safe
memory region under the right circumstances. However, because
the safe region is merely a building block for vps, we consider im-
provements to safememory an orthogonal topic and do not explore
it further in this work.
9 RELATED WORK
Marx [34] reconstructs class hierarchies from binaries for VTable
Protection and Type-safe Object Reuse. VTable Protection verifies at
each vcall whether the vtblptr resides in the reconstructed class hi-
erarchy. However, the analysis is incomplete and the instrumenta-
tion falls back to PathArmor [43] for missing results. Marx’s Type-
safe Object Reuse prevents memory reuse between different class
hierarchies, reducing the damage that can be done with use-after-
free. However, this approach leaves considerable wiggle room for
attackers for large class hierarchies. In contrast, vps does not rely
on class hierarchy information and provides stronger security by
only allowing exactly correct types. Moreover, Marx only protects
the heap whereas vps protects all objects.
VTint [44] instruments vtables with IDs to check their validity,
but unlike vps allows exchanging the original vtblptr with a new
pointer to an existing vtable. Moreover, VTint breaks the binary in
case of false positives.
VTPin [38] overwrites the vtblptr whenever an object is freed,
to protect against use-after-free, but requires RTTI and does not
prevent vtblptr overwrites in general.
vfGuard [36] identifies vtables and builds a mapping of valid
target functions at each vtable offset. At vcalls, it checks the target
and calling convention. Unlike vps, vfGuard allows fake vtables
as long as each entry appears in some valid vtable at the same
offset. Additionally, vfGuard may break the binary in case of false
positives.
T-VIP [24] protects vcalls against fake vtables, but breaks the bi-
nary when vtables reside in writable memory (e.g., in .bss). More-
over, unlike vps, T-VIP uses potentially bypassable heuristics.
VCI [22] only allows a specific set of vtables at each vcall, mim-
icking VTV [41]. When the analysis cannot rebuild the sets pre-
cisely, VCI falls back to vfGuard. Moreover, false positive virtual
callsites in VCI break the application, as may incomplete class hi-
erarchies (e.g., due to abstract classes [34]). In contrast, vps allows
calls through any legitimately created object. Moreover, even in
the hypothetical case of a perfect VCI analysis, VCI allows chang-
ing the vtblptr to another one in the set, unlike vps.
VTV [41] is a GCC compiler pass that only allows a statically
determined set of vtables at each vcall, like most binary-only ap-
proaches [22, 24, 34, 36].
CFIXX [15] is the state-of-the-art in source-based C++ defenses.
Like vps, it stores vtblptrs in safe memory. At each callsite, the
vtblptr is fetched from the safe memory region. Given the lack
of comparison against the vtblptr as stored in the object, CFIXX
prevents but does not detect vtable hijacking. As an LLVM com-
piler extension, CFIXX cannot protect applications for which no
source code is available. Therefore, proprietary legacy applications
cannot be protected afterwards. Moreover, not all software com-
piles on LLVM out-of-the-box (e.g., the Linux kernel [21]). While
CFIXX and vps offer similar security, our binary-level analysis is
completely novel. Unlike source-level analysis, our analysis must
consider both direct and indirect vtable accesses. Moreover, identi-
fying the virtual callsites for subsequent security instrumentation
is challenging given the lack of type information.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented vps, a practical binary-level defense
against C++ vtable hijacking. While priorwork restricts the targets
of virtual calls, we protect objects at creation time and only allow
virtual calls reachable by the object, sidestepping accuracy prob-
lems. vps improves correctness by handling false positives at vcall
verification. During our evaluation, we also uncovered several in-
accuracies in VTV, a source-based approach that is considered the
state-of-the-art for C++ defenses. We release vps as open source
software to foster research on this topic.
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